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July 18, 2006

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Re: No. 1995-43235; *Harry L. Bowles v. George M. Bishop, Charles K. Peterson, and David E. Sharp, et al.*; in the 151st Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas


Dear Jim:

I am in receipt of, and thank you for, Plaintiff's Motion for Rehearing of Bishop, Peterson & Sharp, P.C.'s Motion for Summary Judgment. I feel constrained to call your attention to the fact that Plaintiff's repeated challenge to the finality of Judge Lloyd's February 12, 1996 Order, while ill-founded, is also in direct violation of the anti-suit injunction Order signed by Judge Jeff Brown of the 55<sup>th</sup> Judicial District Court on March 21, 2005. I am confident that you are well aware that Plaintiff's Writ of Prohibition seeking relief from this anti-suit injunction was summarily denied by the First Court of Appeals on June 16, 2006.

As a personal professional courtesy to you, Defendant BPS is not seeking sanctions for Plaintiff's continued challenge to the finality of the February 12, 1996 Order. However, I must caution you that as the costs of defending this claim continue to rise, my client's patience may not endure. I would therefore strongly advise you to reconsider your position and determine whether continuing this course of action is truly in Mr. Bowles' best interest.

As always, if you have any questions or need to reach me for any reason, please feel free to call.

Most cordially,

  
John C. Marshall  
JCM:mab\85.046

cc: Courtesy Copy  
James D. Farmer  
P.O. Box 19798  
Houston, TX 77224

**EXHIBIT N**

NO. 1991-~~25939~~ <sup>LLC d/b/u</sup> \_\_\_\_\_

*1 FILED  
TINNY*

HARRY L. BOWLES

VS.

CHARLES N. SCHWARZ, JR.,  
JOE H. REYNOLDS, and  
ANDREWS KURTH LLP

§ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF  
§ 2005 MAR -2 AM 11:07  
§ SWANSEA TOWNSHIP  
§ HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS  
§ 55<sup>TH</sup> JUDICIAL DISTRICT

ORDER OF PERMANENT INJUNCTION

The Court has considered the Application for Permanent Injunction, verified as required by law, filed on behalf of Charles N. Schwarz, Jr., Joe H. Reynolds, and Andrews Kurth LLP (collectively "Movants"). The Court finds, based upon the evidence presented, and after taking judicial notice of its own file, that Harry L. Bowles ("Bowles") continues to engage in vexatious and harassing litigation in this case long after the final judgment has been entered. In order to protect the finality of the judgment in this case and to protect the Movants from having to respond to repeated efforts by Bowles to re-litigate issues that have been finally determined, the Court finds it is necessary to enjoin and restrain Bowles from filing further pleadings in this case.

The Court specifically takes judicial notice of the previous permanent injunctions entered against Bowles in No. 94-031315 (in the 334<sup>th</sup> District Court) and in No. 96-022972 (in the 151<sup>st</sup> District Court), copies of which were attached to Movants' Application. This Order of Permanent Injunction is intended to

supplement those prior injunctions and to make it clear that Bowles is enjoined from filing any further pleadings in this case, as well as from instigating new litigation that relates to the Final Judgment in this case.

It is therefore ORDERED that Bowles, and anyone acting in concert with him, including his attorneys, are hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from filing any further pleadings in this case. The purported Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Bowles and any other pleadings previously filed by Bowles after the entry of the Final Judgment in this case are deemed to be null and void and of no legal effect.

SIGNED: March 21, 2005.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
PRESIDING JUDGE

NO. \_\_\_\_\_

HARRY L. BOWLES,  
APPLICANT- RELATOR

§  
§  
§  
§

IN THE DISTRICT COURTS  
OF  
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS  
190 TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

FILED  
FELIX ELKSON  
CLERK  
COURT REPORTER  
DISTRICT CLERK  
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS  
FEB 22 1995  
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DEPUTY  
BY

**EX PARTE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF**

This is a petition by Harry L. Bowles presented pro se for habeas corpus relief from restraint imposed on me by illegal permanent injunction issued against me in the 190th District Court on April 10, 1995 in Cause No. 1991-25939 by faux (*No oath to the court*) Visiting Judge Jack O'Neill (*Deceased*). The 1995 permanent injunction was issued summarily ex parte (*without my presence and with legal representation denied*), without any notice, without a judicial hearing and trial on the merits.

**FOREWORD**

1. The illegal injunction order was issued and enforced expressly as a **money laundering device** in a fraudulent receivership proceeding to deny me access to justice to oppose and prevent the theft by misappropriation of my ownership of a company (National Parts Systems, Inc. or "NPS").

2. In November 1992, I employed the law firm Bishop, Peterson & Sharp, P.C. and its president George M. Bishop as my legal counsel to represent me in business litigation in the 190th District Court. In doing so, I was not aware of Bishop's special relationships with prominent political figures and high-profile state and federal judges and lawyers throughout

**EXHIBIT O**

Texas and Harris County as described in the attached copy of an article by Steven Long (**EXHIBIT A**) published in the Houston Press in December 1999 soon after Bishop's conviction in a federal court for tax evasion on \$700,000 of income.

3. George M. Bishop is the individual primarily responsible for the illegal imposition of permanent injunctions placed against me by Harris County courts. His special relationships with Harris County officials and judges have long disallowed my obtaining relief from illegal restraint through normal legal procedure in the courts.

4. During his involvement in Cause No. 1991-25939 from 1992 through 1996, Bishop was engrossed in perpetrating fraud against the following:

- myself;
- the 190th, 334th, 55th, 333rd and 151st District Courts, and the First Court of Appeals;
- his former law partners in Bishop, Peterson & Sharp, P.C.;
- the Internal Revenue Service.
- Further, I contend that he was also engrossed in perpetrating **insurance fraud** directed at, **or in conspiracy with:**

(A) The Home Insurance Company (incorporated in New Hampshire);

(B) Risk Enterprise Management, Ltd. ("REM") a subsidiary of Zurich Insurance Company of Switzerland), Home's manager in rehabilitation prior to liquidation;

(C) Texas Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association in Austin.

5. Bishop, immediately after his employment, entered into an agreement with the opposing counsel to betray me to permit the execution of a fraudulent receivership that resulted in the theft of property from my estate valued at that time at more than \$ 1,000,000.00.

6. Bishop, Peterson and Sharp, P.C. ("BPS") was dissolved in the summer of 1993 to the

effect that the firm breached its contract of employment to me without notice. Thereafter, without my knowledge, George M. Bishop & Associates, a sole proprietorship unregistered as a corporation in Texas, operated as a legal representative or surrogate for BPS in order to maintain legal malpractice insurance coverage. (See letter to Home Insurance dated December 29, 1993 attached as **EXHIBIT B**).

7. Evidence shows that Bishop, as a surrogate for BPS, was engaged in a scheme to defraud The Home Insurance Company ("Home"), which company provided BPS with legal malpractice insurance until BPS was dissolved in the summer of 1993.

7A. Home's policy specifically states in its **Exclusions Clause** that the policy is inapplicable to cover my lawsuit against George M. Bishop & Associates and against BPS. The clause reads as follows:

#### **Section C – Exclusions**

I. This policy does not apply:

(a) to any **judgment or final adjudication** based upon or arising out of any dishonest, deliberately fraudulent, criminal, maliciously or deliberately wrongful acts or omissions committed by the Insured;

(b) to any claim **made by or against** any business enterprise not named in the Declarations which is owned by the Insured or in which the insured is a partner or employee, or which is controlled operated or managed by the Insured, either individually or in a fiduciary capacity, including the ownership maintenance or use of any property in connection therewith, or to any claim made against the Insured solely because the insured is a partner, officer, director, stockholder employee or employee of any firm or corporation not named in the Declarations.

(f) to any claim made by a present, former or prospective partner, officer, director, stockholder employee or employee of the Insured unless such claim arises out of the professional services of the Insured in a lawyer-client relationship except as otherwise excluded under Exclusion (h).

(h) to any claim based upon or arising out of the work performed by the Insured . . . with respect to any corporation . . . association . . . business enterprise or other venture . . . of any kind or nature in which any Insured has any pecuniary or beneficial interest, irrespective of whether or not an attorney-client relationship exists, unless such entity is named in the Declarations.

7B. Home went into rehabilitation in 1995 and wrote no new policies thereafter. Zurich Insurance, through its specially created subsidiary, Risk Enterprise Management, Ltd., assumed control of the company until Home entered into liquidation on June 13, 2003 with the New Hampshire Insurance Commissioner named as Liquidator.

7C. Neither Bishop nor any other party insured under the Home insurance policy covering BPS shareholders ever filed a Proof of Claim with the Liquidator after June 13, 2003. Pursuant to the Order of Liquidation and the New Hampshire Insurance Code this was the sole way a claim under any Home policy could be resolved after June 13, 2003. The Code states that a two year statute of limitations applies to limit the time after the date of liquidation in which the Liquidator may authorize an intervention in any ongoing action against Home, if any such action is pending.

8. Bishop, by fraud (possibly involving conspiracy with unidentified officials with TPCIGA in Texas or officials or former officials with Zurich subsidiary Risk Enterprise Management, Ltd. or former Home Insurance officials) was provided legal representation in August 2005 by the Texas Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("TPCIGA"). TPCIGA's attorney intermeddled in my legal malpractice lawsuit against Bishop and, as was prearranged, quickly obtained summary judgment dismissal of my suit.

8A. TPCIGA's interference was without its appearance as a third-party defendant. TPCIGA fraudulently intervened in defense of a Home policy that had long been cancelled and that was inapplicable to cover my legal malpractice lawsuit against BPS and George M. Bishop & Associates. This is proven by the fact that no insureds ever made a claim with the Liquidator after June 13, 2003. (Refer to Item 7C above).

8B. I declare that TPCIGA's August 2005 intervention was a felony crime in violation of

Section 32.46 of the Texas Penal Code – securing the execution of a document by deception.

9. Bishop worked a fraud upon the 190th Court in the year 1994 in Case 1991-25939 by his false representation that the defunct firm Bishop, Peterson & Sharp P.C. was an assignee of a 40 percent interest in funds due me from the sale of capital shares by a receiver. BPS had rendered no legal services to me of any kind to earn fees awarded to BPS that totaled some \$226,000.

10. The above items bear consideration in this court's consideration of this application, showing that Bishop's professional misconduct was fraud by design with guarantee of funds to betray his own client and that there would be no disciplinary action taken against him.

11. This begs the question of whether this court can or will take jurisdiction of this application for habeas relief in light of the public information that Bishop is invincibly protected by friends in high places.

### HISTORY

12. In October 1993 in Cause No. 1991-25939 in the 190th District Court I consented to a Rule 11 Settlement Agreement to settle a business dispute between myself as plaintiff and my former business partner, Defendant Schwarz. Schwarz and I each owned 50 percent of the shares of National Parts Systems, Inc. ("NPS"). I had sued Schwarz for embezzlement of company funds and other frauds. Immediately prior to trial before a jury, we reached a settlement agreement in the courtroom. The agreement was that Schwarz would return the funds stolen from the company and the company would be sold by a court-appointed receiver to the highest bidder, with the net proceeds to be divided equally to Schwarz and myself.

13. In March 1994 the appointed receiver, Joe H. Reynolds (*deceased*), informed my lawyer, George M. Bishop, that he would have the court "hold me in contempt of court and put me in jail" for resisting his sale of the company at a price far below the highest offer received at the bid



opening in December, 1993. Bishop also adamantly demanded that I agree to the sale arranged by Reynolds, despite Reynolds' failure to carry out the terms of the Order Appointing Receiver and the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

14. On March 16, 1994 Bishop informed me he would not support my demand that the receiver be removed for breach of fiduciary duty and requested I find other counsel. (See attached **EXHIBIT C**).

15. On April 6, 1994 Bishop gave me an ultimatum to agree to a sale "to the highest bidder" at a negotiated price some \$400,000 below the highest offer received at bid opening, which price was far below the offer I myself submitted to purchase the company and that Reynolds refused to consider. He falsely accused me of having threatened to "kill Mr. Reynolds" and attempting to violate the Settlement Agreement. (See attached **EXHIBIT D**). The threat invented by Bishop was a clever ploy that he would use to obtain an injunction to prohibit me from interfering with the sale of NPS to Schwarz the low bidder, instead of selling to me as high bidder.

16. In my April 7, 1994 response to Bishop's ultimatum, I denied threatening Reynolds and declared myself to be the highest bidder. (See attached **EXHIBIT E**).

17. The culmination of this conflict was that Bishop's withdrawal notice was filed on April 8, 1994 and filed simultaneously with that was a Request of Receiver for Permanent Injunction filed by Joe H. Reynolds. (See attached **EXHIBIT F**). Papers were delivered to my home without service stating a hearing on the motion to withdraw and the request for injunction would be held on two days notice on Monday, April 11, 1994.

18. The complaint requesting a restraining order or permanent injunction against me was void on its face as it was unsigned and unverified as specifically required by Texas law set out in Rules 680 and in Rule 682, T.R.C.P. Nevertheless, a "criminal trial" was held in a civil court

on April 11, 1994 not in the 190th District Court before an elected judge, but before unelected faux Judge Jack O'Neill in another courtroom. O'Neill was not appointed to the other court by the Administrative judge to conduct a hearing he just selected an empty court and without oath to any court impersonated Judge Roy Bean as "the law west of the Pecos." *Let's give him a fair trial before we hang him boys.*"

19. The requested permanent injunction was issued on April 11, 1994 and was later revised to show that it was a temporary injunction dated April 18, 1994. (See attached **EXHIBIT G**). I was not present and had no legal representation. My verified denial of guilt and my objections to the violation of Texas law setting out injunction procedure as well as my wife's supporting affidavit were noted as received but were openly ignored as without legal significance. The hanging hearing without legal notice was totally in violation of Texas law.

20. The temporary injunction order states that there was a trial in which I was found guilty (in absentia) of making a terroristic threat to kill complainant Joe H. Reynolds, a court official serving as an appointed Receiver in Cause No. 1991-25939. It includes the finding that I exhibited "**irrational, belligerent, and hostile behavior and actions to Reynolds and other parties and counsel during the course of this case**". I was restrained from all further contact with all attorneys and court officials in the case, including George M. Bishop.

21. The proceeding featured hearsay testimony by disbarred attorney and convicted felon George Bishop that I (Bowles) had made a terroristic threat to "kill" Joe Reynolds during a telephone conversation that was allegedly overheard by a witness, attorney Robert M. Blaine Jr.

22. I attest that I deposed Robert M. Blaine Jr. on June 9, 1994 and that he denied having overheard a conversation in which I made a terroristic threat against Joe H. Reynolds.

23. Further proof that Bishop and Blaine committed aggravated perjury in testimony before

Judge O'Neill on April 11, 1994 is in a letter dated May 16, 1994, (See attached **EXHIBIT H**) from Bishop to Reynolds stating that the charge of my having made a terroristic threat could only be proven by production of a recording **of a telephone conversation that never existed.**

24. The temporary injunction order is void on its face for reason that it violates Rule 683, T.R.C.P. wherein it states that, **“Every order granting a temporary injunction shall include an order setting the cause for trial on the merits with respect to the ultimate relief sought”.**

25. My response to this criminal official oppression was to complain to the District Attorney, judicial authorities and to the Texas State Bar. Further, I took deposition testimony from Joe Reynolds, George Bishop and Robert Blaine to prove and did prove their testimony in the court was knowingly and intentionally false and perjurious.

26. All authorities refused to act to discipline the outrageous professional and criminal official oppression to which I was subjected in the 190th District Court, the results and effect of which continue to plague me to this day, fifteen years later.

27. In particular, the State Bar rejected my May 1994 complaint (No. H0059406411) against Reynolds in total disregard of the 60 exhibits provided them proving fraud, extortion, theft, abuse of process and breach of fiduciary duty in the receivership. Instead, the Bar gave full faith and credit to Reynolds' defense (See attached **EXHIBIT I**), which consisted of the false Temporary Injunction Order and testimony describing me as a **“surly, vicious, dangerous, rude, deranged, irresponsible and raving” individual who should be disciplined by the Bar.**

**It is important to note that I had never Met or spoken to Reynolds until I deposed him over one year after my complaint to the State Bar.** Reynolds statements were a pure fabrication and vicious lie against my honorable character for the express purpose of abolishing my right to contest his unlawful conduct of the receivership.

28. **It is important to note that Reynolds refused to admit having a fiduciary relationship to me, which sums up and proves the fact that he was totally unqualified to serve as a competent and unbiased Receiver.**

29. This defamation of my character in the false injunction order remain in the Harris County public court records and in the State Bar's records as proven adjudicated fact.

30. I attest that that said illegal April 18, 1994 temporary injunction was made permanent when it was incorporated as one of twenty five items in an order titled Order Approving Actions of and Discharging Receiver dated April 10, 1995 signed, again, by faux Visiting Judge Jack O'Neill. (Order attached as **EXHIBIT J**).

31. Said item "o." of the order states simply as follows: **"The Court finds and orders that the Order Granting Temporary Injunction entered by this Court on April 18, 1994 is hereby considered and such injunction is made permanent."**

31A. Said permanent injunction order is in direct violation of Rule 687, T.R.C.P. and is therefore null, void and unenforceable on its face. Rule 687 reads in pertinent part:

**RULE 687. Requisites of Writ**

The writ of injunction shall be sufficient if it contains substantially the following requisites:

- (a) Its style shall be, "The State of Texas."
- (b) It shall be directed to the person or persons enjoined.
- (c) It must state the name of the parties to the proceedings, plaintiff and defendant, and the nature of the plaintiff's application, with the action of the judge thereon.
- (d) It must command the person or persons to whom it is directed to desist and refrain from the commission or continuance of the act enjoined, or to obey and execute such order as the judge has seen proper to make.

31B. Despite the fact that the permanent injunction order dated April 10, 1995 violated every provision of Rule 687, T.R.C.P., the illegal order was, and has continued to be, enforced against me as legal and proper by public servants and officials of the State of Texas including,

specifically, District and Administrative Judges.

**ADDITIONAL ACTS TO DENY MY ACCESS TO JUSTICE**

32. I attest that I appealed the April 10, 1995 Order Approving Actions of and Discharging Receiver to the First Court of Appeals, objecting specifically to the subject permanent injunction against me and the unconstitutional and illegal manner by which it was rendered.

33. I attest that on December 14, 1995 the First Court of Appeals rendered a decision refusing jurisdiction for reason that the April 10, 1995 Order Approving Actions of and Discharging Receiver was **not an appealable final order. (See attached EXHIBIT K).** The Appellate decision was requested by, and was granted to, the opposing attorney Grant Cook who was fully aware that I would prevail on appeal unless the appeal was rejected.

34. In Texas law, a permanent injunction is always an appealable final judgment as is any major order in a receivership proceeding. **The First Court of Appeals knowingly erred in its decision, exhibiting that court's blatant bias and prejudice against me in violation of the judges' oaths of office requiring them to uphold and support the laws and constitutional principles.**

35. **I properly exhausted my right of appeal to the appellate courts. This habeas application is not subject to dismissal due to availability of relief in the appellate courts.**

36. In open contempt of the December 1995 decision by the First Court of Appeals stating that the April 10, 1995 order was "not final" as to my complaints, Cause No. 1991-25939 was not remanded to the 190<sup>th</sup> Court, but was illegally transferred to the 334th Court. In that court the April 10, 1995 Order Approving Actions of and Discharging Receiver was "**carried forward**" in a **Final Summary Judgment dated February 12, 1996.** (Copy of order attached as **EXHIBIT**

L). Clearly, this order never addresses the validity of the injunctions rendered against me in the 190th Court. *The injunction orders had not been and have never been the subject of a judicial determination as to their validity.*

37. Because the appellate court ruled that the April 1995 permanent injunction order was not a final judgment in the 190th Court, it could also not be “brought forward” or considered a final judgment in the 334th Court or in litigation in any other court in which the injunction was applied or where its validity was brought into question. These courts include the 344th, the 55th and the 151st District Courts as well as the First and Fourteenth appellate courts.

*Of interest is the fact that after accusing Judge Russell Lloyd of being suborned by the alliance of Bishop and Cook to sign a fraudulent Order without jurisdiction in this case, Judge Lloyd resigned from the bench of the 334<sup>th</sup> District Court.*

38. **The scope of the bias and prejudice and the violation of my sovereign rights inherent in the April 1995 permanent injunction was expanded and amplified by a second permanent injunction issued by the 55th District Court on the same basis on March 21, 2005. Copy attached as EXHIBIT M.**

39. This second fraudulent ex parte permanent injunction order was summarily rendered by Judge Jeff Brown in the 55th District Court on the basis that permanent injunctions rendered by the 334th and 151st District Courts were valid and enforceable, when, in fact, they were null and void on their faces as a matter of law because they were based on the illegal and invalid permanent injunction orders issued by the 190th District Court.

40. The original permanent injunction dated April 10, 1995 has most recently been employed to my legal and financial disadvantage in a contempt of court action brought against me in the 151st District Court on December 12, 2006. That action was subjected to final judgment on September 2, 2008. This was preceded by a false Gov. Code 51.903(c) Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law document signed by Judge Tad Halbach in the 333rd District Court on December 18, 2006.

41. The December 12, 2006 contempt action was issued on the basis that I am permanently

enjoined from engaging in litigation in Cause No. 1991-25939 by the order issued by the 190th District Court on April 10, 1995 that was illegally “carried forward” by the 334th Court’s July 12, 1996 summary judgment, and that was re-imposed and reinforced by the 55th Court’s permanent injunction order dated March 21, 2005.

42. At no time has any court in Harris County ever rendered a legal injunction against me after proper notice, hearing or trial. The courts hold they have “inherent power” to deny me justice by constitutional due process. **The courts have no such power.**

### **RESULTS AND EFFECTS OF ILLEGAL INJUNCTION ORDERS**

43. The injunction orders injunctions rendered against me by the 190th Court in 1994 and 1995 are public documents in the records of the Harris County courts and on the Internet available to be used against me in any judicial proceeding or in any public forum to falsely portray me as a person with a criminal record and a continuing threat to the proper and legal operation of government.

44. As a result, my position in society is not unlike that of a convicted and registered sex offender in the criminal justice system, fraudulently branded for life. Falsely describing or holding out any person as an irrational, belligerent, and hostile “dangerous terrorist” by a blatantly fraudulent judicial decree in current society is unacceptable and intolerable; it constitutes official oppression, and I demand complete expungement of this degrading false public record by an binding court order.

45. The illegal injunctions rendered against me by the 190th Court in 1994 and 1995 have operated and continue to operate to permanently deny me access to justice in Texas. Habeas corpus is the proper (and my only) avenue of relief for this unpardonable ostracism.

### **MOTIVATION FOR FRAUD – MONEY LAUNDERING**

46. I testify that Bishop, my former attorney in Cause No. 1991-25939 conspired against me

pursuant to an agreement with my opponent's attorney Grant Cook that he would never interfere with Joe Reynolds' conduct of the receivership under any circumstance.

47. Bishop at all times was aware that Reynolds' conduct of the receivership was in violation of Texas receivership law.

48. I testify that the conspirator's motivation was to obtain a court order to enjoin me and thus deny me my legal right to challenge or object to the illegal conduct of the receivership.

49. I attest that the illegal injunctions against me were secured for the express purpose of obtaining a false court judgment by default against me in a scheme to illegally expropriate my 50% ownership of a company of which I was the founder.

50. I complain that the illegal injunction orders against me were employed to extinguish my legal right to withdraw from participation in the Rule 11 Settlement Agreement entered into on October 25, 1993 prior to a final judgment on that agreement.

51. My withdrawal notice dated March 31, 1995 (copy attached as **EXHIBIT N**) has never been recognized in the courts due to the illegal injunction orders issued by the 190th Court on April 11, 1994 and April 10, 1995.

52. In fact, in direct contempt of Texas law and of my legal right to withdraw from the Settlement Agreement prior to a final judgment on the Agreement, Civil Administrative Judge David West issued a transfer order dated April 13, 1995 to send Cause No. 1991-25939 to the 334th District Court as a still-active case. The transfer ignored the fact that I was already a litigant in that court in Cause No. 1994-31315, a suit I had filed against Receiver Reynolds charging him with fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.

52. Then, to add insult to injury, Receiver Reynolds and his law firm Andrews & Kurth, L.L.P. proceeded to secure a new ex parte permanent injunction order from 334th Court Judge



Russell Lloyd dated May 1, 1995 against me to restrain me from filing any additional claims against them in any court without the prior written consent of the 334th Court. This order is attached hereto as **EXHIBIT O**.

53. EXHIBIT O references the previous illegal injunction orders issued against me by the 190th District Court and refers to me as having threatened, harassed and intimidated Reynolds and A&K in Cause No. 1991-25939 in that court. Thus, Reynolds and A&K obtained permanent immunity from my legal right to sue the Receiver for his despicable, conspiratorial, criminal contempt of Texas law set out in the statute regulating the conduct of receiverships.

54. I testify that the purpose of the illegal injunction orders was to facilitate money laundering of my property illicitly expropriated without my consent.

55. Money laundering is defined as “ the taking of any action with property of any form which is wholly or on part the proceeds of a crime that will disguise the fact that that property is the proceeds of a crime or obscure the ownership of said property” (See Wikipedia -Internet).

56. The expropriation and misappropriation of my property after my withdrawal from the Settlement Agreement by notice dated March 31, 1995 was and is a criminal act per se.

57. Any permanent injunction that permanently restrains a citizen from the performance of any act imposed by a court without notice or trial or due process of any kind constitutes official oppression and is a crime per se in violation of Section 39.03 of the Texas Penal Code.

#### **TEXAS LAW SUPPORTS HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF IN THIS CASE**

58. I have no legal remedy to obtain relief from the restraints imposed on me other than through a habeas corpus action to void all permanent injunctions that have been rendered against me without due process and trials on the merits.

59. Texas and federal law supports grant of this application for habeas corpus relief.

60. The statutory provisions governing habeas corpus apply to all cases of habeas corpus for the release of persons illegally held or in any manner restrained in their personal liberty.

61. Habeas corpus is a writ of right<sup>1</sup> that lies when one is restrained of liberty, regardless of the offense charged, since the proceeding is independent of the offense charged.<sup>2</sup>

62. The remedy of habeas corpus is collateral, rather than a direct; attack on the proceedings under which the restraint complained of has been imposed.<sup>3</sup>

63. A person may be “under restraint” for habeas corpus purposes, under the circumstance that he is subject to an invalid contempt commitment<sup>4</sup>.

64. The sole function of the writ is to furnish relief against **unlawful restraints** or custody.<sup>5</sup>

65. The purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding, therefore, is to ascertain whether the relator has been confined unlawfully.<sup>6</sup>

66. The sole purpose of a postconviction writ of habeas corpus is to review jurisdictional defects or denials of fundamental or constitutional rights.<sup>7</sup>

67. The writ of habeas corpus is intended to be applicable to all cases of confinement and restraint, where there is no lawful right in the person exercising the power, or where the power is exercised in a manner or degree not sanctioned by law.<sup>8</sup>

### **NATURE OF THIS APPLICATION**

68. Two actors in the April 1994 and April 1995 injunction proceedings against me have died of natural causes, Visiting Judge O’Neill and Receiver Joe H. Reynolds. Their deaths in no way diminish my need for habeas relief because the cloud of restraint I live under will never be lifted until this, the 190th District Court, acts affirmatively to remove the public record that I am a

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<sup>1</sup> Tex. Const. Art. I, Section 12

<sup>2</sup> McCormick v. Sheppard, 126 Tex. 25, 86 S.W.2d 213.

<sup>3</sup> Deramus v. Thornton, 160 Tex. 494, 333 S.W.2d 824 (1960)

<sup>4</sup> Ex parte Hodge, 389 S.W.2d 463 (tex. 965)

<sup>5</sup> Ex parte Ramzy, 424 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. 1968)

<sup>6</sup> In re Parr, 199 S.W. 3d 457 (Tex. App. Houston 1 st Dist. 2006)

<sup>7</sup> Ex parte Tovar, 901 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)

<sup>8</sup> Art. 11.23, Tex. Code of Crim. App.

dangerous, convicted terrorist.

69. Generally, a writ of habeas corpus is an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction directed to anyone having a person in his or her custody, or under his or her restraint, commanding the custodian to produce such person, at a time or place named in the writ, and show why the person is held in custody or under restraint. Rocha v. Schuble, 809 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1991).

70. In my case, the illegal permanent injunction primarily addressed here was one item inserted into the order titled Order Approving Actions of and Discharging Receiver. It must be presumed per Rule 687 that it was issued by the State of Texas as represented by Visiting Judge Jack O'Neill, Harris County court officials, as well as the First Court of Appeals.

71. Its continuing and permanent effect is to label me as **“surly, vicious, dangerous, rude, deranged, irresponsible and raving”** is global. I am publicly described as an “irrational, belligerent, and hostile” terrorist apt to physically harm public servants performing their duties of office. I am under restraint as a ward of the courts, unable to function freely in the courts to exercise my sovereign constitutional rights.

72. Thus, this application for habeas corpus relief is directed in the first instance at this court and requests it render writ of habeas corpus relief consisting of an order directed to all county, state and federal government officials declaring that the temporary and permanent injunction orders against me issued by this Court on April 11, 1994 and on April 10, 1995, respectively, were illegally executed and are null, void and without legal effect.

73. Further, the writ must declare that all permanent injunctions issued against me in Harris County courts (related as to the parties to the April 11, 1994 Temporary Injunction Order) that were issued by summary judgment without my presence in the court or without a trial on the

merits shall be considered illegally executed and declared null, void and without legal effect.

### **CONCLUSION – REQUEST FOR RELIEF**

74. By these illegal permanent injunctions I have been permanently branded a threat to society. I have been illegally excommunicated. I have been illegally and falsely defamed in public documents in the courts and in State Bar of Texas records. All injunctions against me since 1994 have been summarily imposed illegally for an illicit purpose.

75. Reiterating, falsely describing or holding out any person as a hostile, deranged and dangerous terrorist by a judicial decree in current society is unacceptable and intolerable it constitutes official oppression. I demand complete expungement of this degrading false public record issued against me.

76. I petition this Court to grant me habeas corpus relief in consideration of the facts and Texas statutory and case law whereby the permanent injunction placed against me in this 190th District Court by order dated April 10, 1995 shall be held illegal, null, void, unenforceable, and without legal effect.


77. I petition this Court to grant me habeas corpus relief in consideration of the facts and Texas statutory and case law whereby all permanent injunctions summarily placed against me without trials on the merits since April 1994 and that flowed out of and were a continuation of the original April 1994 temporary injunction shall be held illegal, null, void, unenforceable, and without legal effect. These include the following: (1) the permanent injunction dated May 1, 1995 in the 334th District Court; (2) the permanent injunction dated March 21, 2005 in the 55th District Court; (3) the permanent injunction dated July 26, 1996 in the 151st District Court.

78. I will reiterate per item 36 above that **the injunction orders have never been the**

subject of a judicial determination as to their validity. I reiterate that any permanent injunction order issued without due process and without a trial on the merits constitutes criminal official oppression in violation of the Section 39.03 of the Texas Penal Code.

79. This Court, **representing the State of Texas**, and being the court that rendered the original fraudulent injunction from which all other fraudulent injunctions flowed has a judicial, moral and ethical duty to grant the application for a writ of habeas corpus to right the grievous wrong perpetrated against me, causing untold damage to myself and my family.

Respectfully submitted,



Harry L. Bowles, Applicant  
306 Big Hollow Lane  
Houston, Texas 77042  
Tel. 713-983-6779 Fax 713-983-6722

Attachments:

Personal verification

Proposed Order Granting Habeas Corpus Relief

Exhibits A - O

**VERIFICATION**

STATE OF TEXAS

COUNTY OF HARRIS

My name is Harry Louis Bowles. I am a long-time resident and citizen of Harris County, over the age of eighteen, and I am fully qualified, capable and competent to make this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. I present the attached petition under pain and penalty of perjury. All statements made therein are true and correct and are made on my personal knowledge. All supporting documents are contained in my personal records and, where applicable, are true copies of documents in the court records of Harris County.

I declare that this petition is made for no purpose other than to remove the false and demeaning public perception that I am a person convicted of terroristic activity and a continuing threat to the orderly functioning of government in Texas and the nation. My constitutional rights to life and liberty are seriously impaired and I demand they be fully and completely restored.

Signed this 23RD DAY of MARCH, 2010

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Harry Louis Bowles". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above a horizontal line.